









ABSTRACT This paper explores the history of inﬂation-indexed bond mar-
kets in the United States and the United Kingdom. It documents a massive
decline in long-term real interest rates from the 1990s until 2008, followed by
a sudden spike during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Breakeven inﬂation rates,
calculated from inﬂation-indexed and nominal government bond yields, were
stable from 2003 until the fall of 2008, when they showed dramatic declines.
The paper asks to what extent short-term real interest rates, bond risks, and
liquidity explain the trends before 2008 and the unusual developments that
followed. Low yields and high short-term volatility of returns do not invalidate
the basic case for inﬂation-indexed bonds, which is that they provide a safe
asset for long-term investors. Governments should expect inﬂation-indexed
bonds to be a relatively cheap form of debt ﬁnancing in the future, even though
they have offered high returns over the past decade.
I
n recent years government-issued inﬂation-indexed bonds have become
available in a number of countries and have provided a fundamentally
new instrument for use in retirement saving. Because expected inﬂation
varies over time, conventional, nonindexed (nominal) Treasury bonds are
not safe in real terms; and because short-term real interest rates vary over
time, Treasury bills are not safe assets for long-term investors. Inﬂation-
indexed bonds ﬁll this gap by offering a truly riskless long-term investment
(Campbell and Shiller 1997; Campbell and Viceira 2001, 2002; Brennan
and Xia 2002; Campbell, Chan, and Viceira 2003; Wachter 2003).
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1980s, and the U.S. government followed suit by introducing Treasury
inﬂation-protected securities (TIPS) in 1997. Inﬂation-indexed government
bonds are also available in many other countries, including Canada, France,
and Japan. These bonds are now widely accepted financial instruments.
However, their history creates some new puzzles that deserve investigation.
First, given that the real interest rate is determined in the long run by
the marginal product of capital, one might expect inflation-indexed bond
yields to be extremely stable over time. But whereas 10-year annual yields
on U.K. inﬂation-indexed bonds averaged about 3.5 percent during the 1990s
(Barr and Campbell 1997), and those on U.S. TIPS exceeded 4 percent
around the turn of the millennium, by the mid-2000s yields on both coun-
tries’ bonds averaged below 2 percent, bottoming out at around 1 percent
in early 2008 before spiking to near 3 percent in late 2008. The massive
decline in long-term real interest rates from the 1990s to the 2000s is one
puzzle, and the instability in 2008 is another.
Second, in recent years inflation-indexed bond prices have tended to
move opposite to stock prices, so that these bonds have a negative “beta”
with the stock market and can be used to hedge equity risk. This has
been even more true of prices on nominal government bonds, although
these bonds behaved very differently in the 1970s and 1980s (Campbell,
Sunderam, and Viceira 2009). The reason for the negative beta on inﬂation-
indexed bonds is not well understood.
Third, given integrated world capital markets, one might expect that
inﬂation-indexed bond yields would be similar around the world. But this
is not always the case. During the ﬁrst half of 2000, the yield gap between
U.S. and U.K. inflation-indexed bonds was over 2 percentage points,
although yields have since converged. In January 2008, 10-year yields
were similar in the United States and the United Kingdom, but elsewhere
yields ranged from 1.1 percent in Japan to almost 2.0 percent in France
(according to Bloomberg data). Yield differentials were even larger at
long maturities, with U.K. yields well below 1 percent and French yields
well above 2 percent.
To understand these phenomena, it is useful to distinguish three major
influences on inflation-indexed bond yields: current and expected future
short-term real interest rates; differences in expected returns on long-term
and short-term inﬂation-indexed bonds caused by risk premiums (which
can be negative if these bonds are valuable hedges); and differences in
expected returns on long-term and short-term bonds caused by liquidity
premiums or technical factors that segment the bond markets. The expecta-
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that only the ﬁrst inﬂuence is time-varying whereas the other two are con-
stant. However, there is considerable evidence against this hypothesis for
nominal Treasury bonds, so it is important to allow for the possibility that
risk and liquidity premiums are time-varying.
The path of real interest rates is undoubtedly a major influence on
inflation-indexed bond yields. Indeed, before TIPS were issued, Campbell
and Shiller (1997) argued that one could anticipate how their yields would
behave by applying the expectations hypothesis of the term structure to real
interest rates. A ﬁrst goal of this paper is to compare the history of inﬂation-
indexed bond yields with the implications of the expectations hypothesis,
and to explain how shocks to short-term real interest rates are transmitted
along the real yield curve.
Risk premiums on inﬂation-indexed bonds can be analyzed by applying
theoretical models of risk and return. Two leading paradigms deliver use-
ful insights. The consumption-based paradigm implies that risk premiums
on inﬂation-indexed bonds over short-term debt are negative if returns on
these bonds covary negatively with consumption, which will be the case if
consumption growth rates are persistent (Backus and Zin 1994; Campbell
1986; Gollier 2007; Piazzesi and Schneider 2007; Wachter 2006). The
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) implies that risk premiums on inﬂation-
indexed bonds will be negative if their prices covary negatively with stock
prices. The second paradigm has the advantage that it is easy to track the
covariance of inﬂation-indexed bonds and stocks using high-frequency data
on their prices, in the manner of Viceira and Mitsui (2007) and Campbell,
Adi Sunderam, and Viceira (2009).
Finally, it is important to take seriously the effects of institutional factors
on inﬂation-indexed bond yields. Plausibly, the high TIPS yields in the ﬁrst
few years after their introduction were due to the slow development of TIPS
mutual funds and other indirect investment vehicles. Currently, long-term
inﬂation-indexed yields in the United Kingdom may be depressed by strong
demand from U.K. pension funds. The volatility of TIPS yields in the fall
of 2008 appears to have resulted in part from the unwinding of large insti-
tutional positions after the failure of the investment bank Lehman Brothers
in September. These institutional inﬂuences on yields can alternatively be
described as liquidity, market segmentation, or demand and supply effects
(Greenwood and Vayanos 2008).
This paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a graphical his-
tory of the inflation-indexed bond markets in the United States and the
United Kingdom, discussing bond supplies, the levels of yields, and the
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yields. Section II asks what portion of the TIPS yield history can be
explained by movements in short-term real interest rates, together with
the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. This section revisits
the vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of Campbell and Shiller (1997).
Section III discusses the risk characteristics of TIPS and estimates a model
of TIPS pricing with time-varying systematic risk, a variant of the model
in Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2009), to see how much of the yield
history can be explained by changes in risk. Section IV discusses the unusual
market conditions that prevailed in the fall of 2008 and the channels through
which they might have influenced inflation-indexed bond yields. Sec-
tion V draws implications for investors and policymakers. An appendix
available online presents technical details of our bond pricing model and
of data construction.
1
I. The History of Inﬂation-Indexed Bond Markets
The top panel of figure 1 shows the growth of the outstanding supply of
TIPS during the past 10 years. From modest beginnings in 1997, TIPS
grew to around 10 percent of the marketable debt of the U.S. Treasury, and
more than 3.5 percent of U.S. GDP, in 2008. This growth has been fairly
smooth, with a minor slowdown in 2001–02. The bottom panel shows a
comparable history for U.K. inﬂation-indexed gilts (government bonds).
From equally modest beginnings in 1982, the stock of these bonds has
grown rapidly and accounted for almost 30 percent of the British public
debt in 2008, equivalent to about 10 percent of GDP. Growth in the inﬂation-
indexed share of the public debt slowed in 1990–97 and reversed in 2004–05
but otherwise proceeded at a rapid rate.
The top panel of ﬁgure 2 plots yields on 10-year nominal and inﬂation-
indexed U.S. Treasury bonds from January 1998, a year after their intro-
duction, through March 2009.
2 The ﬁgure shows a considerable decline in
both nominal and real long-term interest rates since TIPS yields peaked
early in 2000. Through 2007 the decline was roughly parallel, as inﬂation-
indexed bond yields fell from slightly over 4 percent to slightly over 
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1. The online appendix can be found at kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/∼campbell/papers.html.
2. We calculate the yield for the longest-maturity inﬂation-indexed bond outstanding at
each point in time whose original maturity at issue was 10 years. This is the on-the-run TIPS
issue. We obtain constant-maturity 10-year yields for nominal Treasury bonds from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Details of data construction are reported in
the online appendix.
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1 percent, while yields on nominal government bonds fell from around 
7 percent to 4 percent. Thus, this was a period in which both nominal
and inflation-indexed Treasury bond yields were driven down by a large
decline in long-term real interest rates. In 2008, in contrast, nominal
Treasury yields continued to decline, while TIPS yields spiked above 
3 percent toward the end of the year.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 2 shows a comparable history for the United
Kingdom since the early 1990s. To facilitate comparison of the two plots,
the beginning of the U.S. sample period is marked with a vertical line. The
downward trend in inﬂation-indexed yields is even more dramatic over
this longer period. U.K. inﬂation-indexed gilts also experienced a dramatic
yield spike in the fall of 2008.
Figure 1. Stocks of Inﬂation-Indexed Government Bonds Outstanding
Percent
United States
Sources: Treasury Bulletin, various issues, table FD-2; Heriot-Watt/Faculty and Institute of Actuaries 
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difference between 10-year nominal and inﬂation-indexed Treasury bond
yields. The breakeven inﬂation rate was fairly volatile in the ﬁrst few years
of the TIPS market; it then stabilized between 1.5 and 2.0 percent a year in
the early years of this decade before creeping up to about 2.5 percent from
2004 through 2007. In 2008 the breakeven inﬂation rate collapsed, reaching
almost zero at the end of the year. The ﬁgure also shows, for the early years
of the sample, the subsequently realized 3-year inﬂation rate. After the ﬁrst
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subsequently realized inﬂation, a slight decrease in breakeven inﬂation
between 2000 and 2002, followed by a slow increase from 2002 to 2006, is
matched by similar gradual changes in realized inﬂation. Although this is
not a rigorous test of the rationality of the TIPS market—apart from any-
thing else, the bonds are forecasting inﬂation over 10 years, not 3 years—
it does suggest that inﬂation forecasts inﬂuence the relative pricing of TIPS
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Figure 3. Breakeven Inﬂation Rates Implied by Ten-Year Nominal Inﬂation-Indexed




Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg and Bureau of Labor Statistics data; see the online 
appendix for details. 
a. Bond yields are computed from spliced yields and price data of individual issuances. 
b. Annualized percent change in the consumer price index over the preceding 3 years.
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next section.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 3 depicts the breakeven inﬂation history for
the United Kingdom. It shows a strong decline in the late 1990s, probably
associated with the granting of independence to the Bank of England by
the newly elected Labour government in 1997, and a steady upward creep
from 2003 to early 2008, followed by a collapse in 2008 comparable to
that in the United States. Realized inﬂation in the United Kingdom also fell
in the 1990s, albeit less dramatically than breakeven inﬂation, and rose in
the mid-2000s.
The top panel of figure 4 examines the short-run volatility of TIPS
returns. Using daily government bond prices, with the appropriate cor-
rection for coupon payments, we calculate daily nominal return series
for the on-the-run 10-year TIPS. This graph plots the annualized standard
deviation of this series within a centered moving one-year window. For
comparison, it also shows the corresponding annualized standard deviation
for 10-year nominal Treasury bond returns, calculated from Bloomberg
yield data on the assumption that the nominal bonds trade at par. The striking
message of this graph is that TIPS returns have become far more volatile in
recent years. In the early years, until 2002, the short-run volatility of 10-year
TIPS was only about half that of 10-year nominal Treasury bonds, but the
two standard deviations converged between 2002 and 2004 and have been
extremely similar since then. The annualized standard deviations of both
bonds ranged between 5 and 8 percent between 2004 and 2008 and then
increased dramatically to almost 14 percent.
Mechanically, two variables drive the volatility of TIPS returns. The more
important of these is the volatility of TIPS yields, which has increased over
time; in recent years it has been very similar to the volatility of nominal
Treasury bond yields as breakeven inﬂation has stabilized. A second, ampli-
fying factor is the duration of TIPS, which has increased as TIPS yields
have declined.
3 The same two variables determine the very similar volatility
patterns shown in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 4 for the United Kingdom.
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3. The duration of a bond is the average time to payment of its cash ﬂows, weighted by
the present values of those cash ﬂows. Duration also equals the elasticity of a bond’s price
with respect to its gross yield (one plus its yield in natural units). A coupon bond has dura-
tion less than its maturity, and its duration increases as its yield falls. Since TIPS yields are
lower than nominal bond yields, TIPS have greater duration for the same maturity, and
hence a greater volatility of returns for the same yield volatility, but the differences in
volatility explained by duration are quite small.
11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 86The top panel of figure 5 plots the annualized standard deviation of
10-year breakeven inﬂation (measured in terms of the value of a bond posi-
tion long a 10-year nominal Treasury bond and short a 10-year TIPS). This
standard deviation trended downward from 7 percent in 1998 to about 
1 percent in 2007 before spiking above 13 percent in 2008. To the extent
that breakeven inflation represents the long-term inflation expectations
of market participants, these expectations stabilized during most of the
sample period but moved dramatically in 2008. Such a destabilization of
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Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg data; see the online appendix for details.  
a. Bond yields are computed from spliced yields and price data of individual issuances.
b. Standard deviation of daily returns on government bonds with 10 years to maturity, over a one-year 
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 87inflation expectations should be a matter of serious concern to the Federal
Reserve, although, as we discuss in section IV, institutional factors may
have contributed to the movements in breakeven inﬂation during the mar-
ket disruption of late 2008. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 5 suggests that the
Bank of England should be equally concerned by the recent destabilization
of the yield spread between nominal and inﬂation-indexed gilts.
Figure 5 also plots the correlations of daily inﬂation-indexed and nom-
inal government bond returns within a one-year moving window. Early in
88 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009
Figure 5. Volatility of Ten-Year Breakeven Inﬂation and Correlation of Nominal and
Inﬂation-Indexed Government Bond Returns, 1992–2009
a
Standard deviation (percent) Correlation coefficient
Correlation coefficient
United States
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg data; see the online appendix for details.  
a. Bond yields are computed from spliced yields and price data of individual issuances.
b. Standard deviation of the daily 10-year breakeven inflation rate, measured in terms of the value of a 
position long a 10-year nominal government bond and short a 10-year inflation-indexed bond, over a 
one-year moving window.
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the period, the correlation for U.S. bonds was quite low at about 0.2, but
it increased to almost 0.9 by the middle of 2003 and stayed there until 2008.
In the mid-2000s TIPS behaved like nominal Treasuries and did not exhibit
independent return variation. This coupling of TIPS and nominal Treasuries
ended in 2008. The same patterns are visible in the U.K. data.
Although TIPS have been volatile assets, this does not necessarily imply
that they should command large risk premiums. According to rational asset
pricing theory, the risk premium on an asset should be driven by the covari-
ance of its returns with the marginal utility of consumption rather than by
the variance of returns. One common proxy for marginal utility, used in the
CAPM, is the return on an aggregate equity index. Figure 6 plots the corre-
lations of daily inﬂation-indexed bond returns, nominal government bond
returns, and breakeven inﬂation returns with daily returns on aggregate U.S.
and U.K. stock indexes, again within a centered moving one-year window.
Figure 7 repeats this exercise for betas (regression coefﬁcients of daily bond
returns and breakeven inﬂation on the same stock indexes).
All these ﬁgures tell a similar story. During the 2000s there has been
considerable instability in both countries in the correlations between gov-
ernment bonds of both types and stock returns, but these correlations have
been predominantly negative, implying that government bonds can be used
to hedge equity risk. To the extent that the CAPM describes risk premiums
across asset classes, government bonds should have predominantly nega-
tive rather than positive risk premiums. The negative correlation is particu-
larly strong for nominal government bonds, because breakeven inﬂation has
been positively correlated with stock returns, especially during 2002–03 and
2007–08. Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2009) build a model in which
a changing correlation between inﬂation and stock returns drives changes
in the risk properties of nominal Treasury bonds. That model assumes a con-
stant equity market correlation for TIPS and thus cannot explain the correla-
tion movements shown for TIPS in ﬁgures 6 and 7. In section III we explore
the determination of TIPS risk premiums in greater detail.
II. Inﬂation-Indexed Bond Yields and the Dynamics 
of Short-Term Real Interest Rates
To understand the movements of inﬂation-indexed bond yields, it is essen-
tial ﬁrst to understand how changes in short-term real interest rates propa-
gate along the real term structure. Declining yields for inﬂation-indexed
bonds in the 2000s may not be particularly surprising given that short-term
real interest rates have also been low in this decade.
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a time-series model for the short-term real interest rate to create a hypo-
thetical TIPS yield series under the assumption that the expectations the-
ory of the term structure in logarithmic form, with zero log risk premiums,
describes inﬂation-indexed bond yields. (This does not require the assump-
tion that the expectations theory describes nominal bond yields, a model that
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Figure 6. Correlations of Ten-Year Government Bond Returns and Breakeven Inﬂation




Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg and Center for Research in Security Prices data; see the 
online appendix for details. 
a. Correlations between nominal returns on the stock index of the indicated country (CRSP 
Value-Weighted Index for the United States, FTSE-100 for the United Kingdom) and either nominal 
10-year returns on the indicated bond type (computed from spliced yields and price data of individual 
issuances) or returns in the breakeven inflation rate (the difference between nominal bond returns and 
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 90has often been rejected in U.S. data.) In this section we update Campbell
and Shiller’s analysis and ask how well the simple expectations theory
describes the 12-year history of TIPS yields.
Campbell and Shiller (1997) estimated a VAR model on quarterly U.S.
data over 1953–94. Their basic VAR included the ex post real return on
a 3-month nominal Treasury bill, the nominal bill yield, and the once-
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Figure 7. Betas of Ten-Year Government Bond Returns and Breakeven Inﬂation Rates




Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg and Center for Research in Security Prices data; see the 
online appendix for details. 
a. Coefficients from a regression of either nominal 10-year returns on the indicated bond type 
(computed from spliced yields and price data of individual issuances) or the breakeven inflation rate (the 
difference between nominal bond returns and inflation-indexed bond returns) on nominal returns on the 
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 91lagged one-year inflation rate. They solved the VAR forward to create
forecasts of future quarterly real interest rates at all horizons, and then
aggregated the forecasts to generate the implied long-term inﬂation-indexed
bond yield.
Table 1 repeats this analysis for 1982–2008. The top panel reports the
estimated VAR coefﬁcients, and the bottom panel reports selected sample
moments of the hypothetical VAR-implied 10-year TIPS yields, and for
comparison the same moments of observed TIPS yields, over the period
since TIPS were introduced. The table delivers several interesting results.
First, the hypothetical yields are considerably lower on average than the
observed yields, with a mean of 1.04 percent compared with 2.66 percent.
This implies that on average, investors demand a risk or liquidity premium
for holding TIPS rather than nominal Treasuries. Second, hypothetical yields
are more stable than observed yields, with a standard deviation of 0.39 per-
cent as opposed to 0.95 percent. This reﬂects the fact that observed yields
have declined more dramatically since 1997 than have hypothetical yields.
Third, hypothetical and observed yields have a relatively high correlation
of 0.71, even though no TIPS data were used to construct the hypothetical
92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009
Table 1. Results of VAR Estimation and Observed and Hypothetical Moments of 
Ten-Year Inﬂation-Indexed Bond Yields, United Statesa
Dependent variable
Inﬂation-indexed Nominal 
Independent variable bill return bill yield Inﬂationb
Inﬂation-indexed bill return −0.06 0.01 −0.21
(0.10) (0.02) (0.10)
Nominal bill yield 0.62 0.95 0.57
(0.17) (0.04) (0.16)
Inﬂation 0.09 −0.04 0.58
(0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
Constant −0.005 0.001 0.007
(0.002) (0.0005) (0.002)
R
2 0.26 0.91 0.63
Moments of 10-year inﬂation-
indexed bond yields Observed Hypothetical
Mean 2.66 1.04
Standard deviation 0.95 0.39
Correlation 0.71
Source: Authors’ regressions. Independent variables are lagged one period.
a. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
b. Non–seasonally adjusted all-urban-consumer price index (NSA CPI-U).
11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 92yields. Real interest rate movements do have an important effect on the TIPS
market, and the VAR system is able to capture much of this effect.
The top panel of ﬁgure 8 shows these results in graphical form, plotting
the history of the observed TIPS yield, the hypothetical VAR-implied TIPS
yield, and the VAR estimate of the ex ante short-term real interest rate. The
sharp decline in the real interest rate in 2001 and 2002 drives down the
hypothetical TIPS yield, but the observed TIPS yield is more volatile and
declines more strongly. The gap between the observed TIPS yield and the
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Figure 8. Hypothetical and Actual Yields on Ten-Year Inﬂation-Indexed Bonds
Percent a year
United States
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg, Center for Research in Security Prices, and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics data; see the online appendix for details. 
a. Quarterly averages of 10-year TIPS yields (from the top panel of figure 2). 
b. Extracted from an estimated VAR(1) model in quarterly U.S. data over 1953–94 on the ex post real 
















Fitted real 3-month Treasury bill rateb
Fitted real 3-month interest rate
2008 2006 2004 2002 2000 1998 1996 1994 1992





11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 93hypothetical yield shrinks fairly steadily over the sample period until the
very end, when the 2008 spike in the observed yield widens the gap again.
These results suggest that when they were ﬁrst issued, TIPS commanded a
high risk or liquidity premium, which then declined until 2008.
Table 2 and the bottom panel of figure 8 repeat these exercises for the
United Kingdom. Here the hypothetical and observed yields have simi-
lar means (2.64 and 2.49 percent, respectively), but again the standard
deviation is lower for the hypothetical yield, at 0.61 percent, than for the
observed yield, at 1.00 percent. The two yields have a high correlation
of 0.77. The graph shows that the VAR model captures much of the decline
in inﬂation-indexed gilt yields since the early 1990s. It is able to do this
because the estimated process for the U.K. ex ante real interest rate is highly
persistent, so that the decline in the real rate over the sample period translates
almost one for one into a declining yield on long-term inflation-indexed
gilts. However, for the same reason the model cannot account for variations
in the spread between the short-term expected real interest rate and the long-
term inﬂation-indexed gilt yield.
It is notable that the expectations hypothesis of the real term structure does
not explain the low average level of inﬂation-indexed gilt yields since 2005.
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Table 2. Results of VAR Estimation and Observed and Hypothetical Moments 
of Ten-Year Inﬂation-Indexed Bond Yields, United Kingdoma
Dependent variable
Inﬂation-indexed Nominal 
Independent variable bill return bill yield Inﬂationb
Inﬂation-indexed bill return 0.09 −0.04 −0.39
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09)
Nominal bill yield 0.42 1.07 0.82
(0.19) (0.05) (0.18)
Inﬂation 0.02 −0.03 0.66
(0.07) (0.02) (0.07)
Constant 0.0001 0.0002 0.0007
(0.0019) (0.0005) (0.0018)
R
2 0.22 0.93 0.87
Moments of 10-year inﬂation-
indexed bond yields Observed Hypothetical
Mean 2.64 2.49
Standard deviation 1.00 0.61
Correlation 0.77
Source: Authors’ regressions. Independent variables are lagged one period.
a. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
b. Retail price index.
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for this. As Viceira and Mitsui (2003) and Dimitri Vayanos and Jean-Luc
Vila (2007) explain, FRS17 requires U.K. pension funds to mark their
liabilities to market, using discount rates derived from government bonds.
The standard was implemented, after some delay, in 2005, and it greatly
increased the demand for inﬂation-indexed gilts from pension funds seek-
ing to hedge their inﬂation-indexed liabilities.
III. The Systematic Risks of Inﬂation-Indexed Bonds
The yield history and VAR analysis presented in the previous two sec-
tions suggest that U.S. and U.K. inflation-indexed bonds had low risk
premiums in the mid-2000s, but the former, at least, had higher risk pre-
miums when they were first issued. In this section we use asset pricing
theory to ask what fundamental properties of the macroeconomy might
lead to high or low risk premiums on inﬂation-indexed bonds. We ﬁrst use
the consumption-based asset pricing framework and then present a less
structured empirical analysis that relates bond risk premiums to changing
covariances of bonds with stocks.
III.A. Consumption-Based Pricing of Inﬂation-Indexed Bonds
A standard paradigm for consumption-based asset pricing assumes that a
representative investor has Epstein-Zin (1989, 1991) preferences. This pref-
erence speciﬁcation, a generalization of power utility, allows the coefﬁcient
of relative risk aversion γ and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS) ψ to be separate free parameters, whereas power utility restricts
one to be the reciprocal of the other. Under the additional assumption that
asset returns and consumption are jointly log normal and homoskedastic,
the Epstein-Zin Euler equation implies that the risk premium RP on any
asset i over the short-term safe asset is
In words, the risk premium is deﬁned to be the expected excess log return
on the asset over the risk-free log return rf, plus one-half its variance to con-
vert from a geometric average to an arithmetic average, that is, to correct for
Jensen’s inequality. The preference parameter θ≡(1 −γ )/[1 − (1/ψ)]; in the
power utility case, γ=1/ψ, so that θ=1. According to this formula, the risk
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 95the consumption covariance σic (scaled by the reciprocal of the EIS), which
gets full weight in the power utility case, and the wealth covariance σiw. The
risk premium is constant over time by the assumption of homoskedasticity.
It is tempting to treat the consumption covariance and the wealth covari-
ance as two separate quantities, but this ignores the fact that consumption
and wealth are linked by the intertemporal budget constraint and by a time-
series Euler equation. By using these additional equations, one can substi-
tute either consumption (Campbell 1993) or wealth (Restoy and Weil 1998)
out of the formula for the risk premium.
The first approach explains the risk premium using covariances with
the current market return and with news about future market returns; this
might be called “CAPM+,” as it generalizes the insight about risk that was
ﬁrst formalized in the CAPM. Campbell (1996) and Campbell and Tuomo
Vuolteenaho (2004) pursue this approach, which can also be regarded as
an empirical version of Robert Merton’s (1973) intertemporal CAPM.
The second approach explains the risk premium using covariances with
current consumption growth and with news about future consumption
growth; this might be called “CCAPM+,” as it generalizes the insight
about risk that is embodied in the consumption-based CAPM with power
utility. This approach has generated a large asset pricing literature in recent
years (for example, Bansal and Yaron 2004; Bansal, Khatchatrian, and
Yaron 2005; Piazzesi and Schneider 2007; Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron 2007;
Bansal, Dittmar, and Kiku 2009; Hansen, Heaton, and Li 2008). Some of
this recent work adds heteroskedasticity to the simple homoskedastic model
discussed here.
The CAPM+ approach delivers an approximate formula for the risk pre-
mium on any asset as
where σiw is the covariance of the unexpected return on asset i with the
return on the aggregate wealth portfolio, and σi,TIPS is the covariance with
the return on an inﬂation-indexed perpetuity.
The intuition, which dates back to Merton (1973), is that conservative
long-term investors value assets that deliver high returns at times when
investment opportunities are poor. Such assets hedge investors against vari-
ation in the sustainable income stream that is delivered by a given amount
of wealth. In a homoskedastic model, risk premiums are constant, and the
relevant measure of long-run investment opportunities is the yield on an
inﬂation-indexed bond. Thus, the covariance with the return on an inﬂation-
RP ii w i T I PS =− − () γσ γ σ 1 , ,
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asset. In equilibrium, an asset that covaries strongly with an inflation-
indexed perpetuity will offer a low return as the price of the desirable insur-
ance it offers.
Applying this formula to the inflation-indexed perpetuity itself, we
find that
In words, the risk premium on a long-term inﬂation-indexed bond is increas-
ing in its covariance with the wealth portfolio, as in the traditional CAPM,
but decreasing in the variance of the bond return whenever the risk aver-
sion of the representative agent is greater than 1. Paradoxically, the insur-
ance value of inﬂation-indexed bonds is higher when these bonds have high
short-term volatility, because in this case they hedge important variability in
investment opportunities. In a traditional model with a constant real interest
rate, inﬂation-indexed bonds have constant yields; but in this case there is
no intertemporal hedging to be done, and the traditional CAPM can be
used to price all assets, including inﬂation-indexed bonds.
The CCAPM+ approach can be written as
where σig is the covariance of the unexpected return on asset i with revi-
sions in expected future consumption growth ~ gt+1, deﬁned by
In equation 2 the risk premium on any asset is the coefficient of risk
aversion γ times the covariance of that asset with consumption growth,
plus (γ−1/ψ) times the covariance of the asset with revisions in expected
future consumption growth, discounted at a constant rate ρ. The second
term is zero if γ=1/ψ, the power utility case, or if consumption growth is
unpredictable so that there are no revisions in expected future consump-
tion growth. Evidence on the equity premium and the time-series behavior
of real interest rates suggests that γ > 1/ψ. This implies that controlling for
assets’ contemporaneous consumption covariance, investors require a risk
premium to hold assets that pay off when expected future consumption
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 97growth increases. Ravi Bansal and Amir Yaron (2004) use the phrase “risks
for the long run” to emphasize this property of the model.
What does this model imply about the pricing of an inﬂation-indexed per-
petuity? When expected real consumption growth increases by 1 percentage
point, the equilibrium real interest rate increases by 1/ψ percentage points,
and thus the return on the inﬂation-indexed perpetuity is given by
4
Combining equation 2 with equation 4, one can solve for the risk premium
on the inﬂation-indexed perpetuity:
With power utility, only the first term in equation 5 is nonzero. This case
is described by Campbell (1986). In a consumption-based asset pricing
model with power utility, assets are risky if their returns covary positively
with consumption growth. Since bond prices rise when interest rates fall,
bonds are risky assets if interest rates fall in response to consumption
growth. Because equilibrium real interest rates are positively related to
expected future consumption growth, this is possible only if positive con-
sumption shocks drive expected future consumption growth downward,
that is, if consumption growth is negatively autocorrelated. In an economy
with temporary downturns in consumption, equilibrium real interest rates
rise and TIPS prices fall in recessions, and therefore investors require a
risk premium to hold TIPS.
In the presence of persistent shocks to consumption growth, by contrast,
consumption growth is positively autocorrelated. In this case recessions
not only drive down current consumption but also lead to prolonged peri-
ods of slow growth, driving down real interest rates. In such an economy
the prices of long-term inﬂation-indexed bonds rise in recessions, making
them desirable hedging assets with negative risk premiums.
This paradigm suggests that the risk premium on TIPS will fall if
investors become less concerned about temporary business-cycle shocks,
and more concerned about shocks to the long-term consumption growth rate.
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4. A more careful derivation of this expression can be found in Campbell (2003, p. 841),
equation 41.
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late 1990s and 2000s, as the Great Moderation mitigated concerns about
business-cycle risk (Bernanke 2004; Blanchard and Simon 2001; Kim and
Nelson 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000; Stock and Watson 2003)
while long-term uncertainties about technological progress and climate
change became more salient. Of course, the events of 2007–08 have brought
business-cycle risk to the fore again. The movements of inﬂation-indexed
bond yields have been broadly consistent with changing risk perceptions
of this sort.
The second term in equation 5 is also negative under the plausible assump-
tion that γ > 1/ψ, and its sign does not depend on the persistence of the con-
sumption process. However, its magnitude does depend on the volatility
of shocks to long-run expected consumption growth. Thus, increasing
uncertainty about long-run growth drives down inflation-indexed bond
premiums through this channel as well.
Overall, the Epstein-Zin paradigm suggests that inﬂation-indexed bonds
should have low or even negative risk premiums relative to short-term safe
assets, consistent with the intuition that these bonds are the safe asset for
long-term investors.
III.B. Bond Risk Premiums and the Bond-Stock Covariance
The consumption-based analysis of the previous section delivers insights
but also has weaknesses. The model assumes constant second moments
and thus implies constant risk premiums; it cannot be used to track chang-
ing variances, covariances, or risk premiums in the inﬂation-indexed bond
market. Although one could generalize the model to allow time-varying
second moments, as in the long-run risks model of Bansal and Yaron (2004),
the low frequency of consumption measurement makes it difﬁcult to imple-
ment the model empirically. In this section we follow a different approach,
writing down a model of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) that allows
us to relate the risk premiums on inﬂation-indexed bonds to the covariance
of these bonds with stock returns.
To capture the time-varying correlation of returns on inﬂation-indexed
bonds with stock returns, we propose a highly stylized term structure model
in which the real interest rate is subject to conditionally heteroskedastic
shocks. Conditional heteroskedasticity is driven by a state variable that
captures time variation in aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty. We build
our model in the spirit of Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2009), who
emphasize the importance of changing macroeconomic conditions for an
understanding of time variation in systematic risk and in the correlations of
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term structure model to allow for heteroskedastic shocks to the real rate.
We assume that the log of the real SDF, mt+1=log Mt+1, can be described by
where xt follows a conditionally heteroskedastic AR(1) process,
and vt follows a standard AR(1) process,
The shocks εm,t+1, εx,t+1, ε′ x,t+1, and εv,t+1 have zero means and are jointly nor-
mally distributed with a constant variance-covariance matrix. We assume
that ε′ x,t+1 and εv,t+1 are orthogonal to each other and to the other shocks in
the model. We adopt the notation σi
2 to describe the variance of shock εi,
and σij to describe the covariance between shock εi and shock εj. The con-
ditional volatility of the log SDF (σm) describes the price of aggregate mar-
ket risk, or the maximum Sharpe ratio in the economy, which we assume to
be constant.
5
The online appendix to this paper (see footnote 1) shows how to solve
this model for the real term structure of interest rates. The state variable xt
is equal to the log short-term real interest rate, which follows an AR(1)
process whose conditional variance is driven by the state variable vt.
In a standard consumption-based power utility model of the sort dis-
cussed in the previous subsection, vt would capture time variation in the
dynamics of consumption growth. When vt is close to zero, shocks to the
real interest rate are uncorrelated with the SDF; in a power utility model,
this would imply that shocks to future consumption growth are uncorrelated
with shocks to the current level of consumption. As vt moves away from
zero, the volatility of the real interest rate increases and its covariance with
the SDF becomes more positive or more negative. In a power utility model,
() . , 81 11 vv t vv v t v t ++ =− () ++ μϕ ϕε
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5. Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2009) consider a much richer term structure
model in which σ
2
m is time varying. They note that in that case the process for the log real
SDF admits an interpretation as a reduced form of structural models such as those of
Bekaert, Engstrom, and Grenadier (2006) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) in which
aggregate risk aversion is time varying. Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira ﬁnd that time-
varying risk aversion plays only a limited role in explaining the observed variation in bond
risk premiums. For simplicity, we set σ
2
m constant.
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consumption growth that is either positive or negative, reflecting either
momentum or mean reversion in consumption. Broadly speaking, one can
interpret vt as a measure of aggregate uncertainty about long-run growth in
the economy. At times when that uncertainty increases, real interest rates
become more volatile.
Solving the model for the real term structure of interest rates, we ﬁnd that
the log price of an n-period inﬂation-indexed bond is linear in the short-
term real interest rate xt, with coefﬁcient Bx,n, and quadratic in aggregate
economic uncertainty vt, with linear coefﬁcient Bv,n and quadratic coefﬁ-
cient Cv,n. An important property of this model is that bond risk premiums
are time varying. They are approximately linear in vt, where the coefﬁcient
on vt is proportional to σ2
m.
A time-varying conditional covariance between the SDF and the real
interest rate implies that the conditional covariance between inflation-
indexed bonds and risky assets such as equities should also vary over time
as a function of vt. To see this, we now introduce equities into the model.
To keep things simple, we assume that the unexpected log return on equi-
ties is given by
This implies that the equity premium equals βemσ2
m, the conditional standard
deviation of stock returns is βemσm, and the Sharpe ratio on equities is σm.
Equities deliver the maximum Sharpe ratio because they are perfectly cor-
related with the SDF. Thus, we are imposing the restrictions of the tradi-
tional CAPM, ignoring the intertemporal hedging arguments stated in the
previous subsection.
The covariance between stocks and inﬂation-indexed bonds is given by
which is proportional to vt. This proportionality is also a reason why we
consider two independent shocks to xt. In the absence of a homoskedastic
shock ε′ x,t to xt, our model would imply that the conditional volatility of
the short-term real interest rate would be proportional to the conditional
covariance of stock returns with returns on inﬂation-indexed bonds. How-
ever, although the two conditional moments appear to be correlated in the
data, they are not perfectly correlated, still less proportional to one another.
We estimate this term structure model by applying the nonlinear Kalman
ﬁlter procedure described in Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2009) to
() , , ,, , 10 11 1 covte t n tx n emm xt rr B v ++ − () =β σ
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 101data on zero-coupon inﬂation-indexed bond yields, from Refet Gürkaynak,
Brian Sack, and Jonathan Wright (2008) for the period 1999–2008, and total
returns on the value-weighted U.S. stock market portfolio, from CRSP data.
6
Because the U.S. Treasury does not issue TIPS with short maturities, and
there are no continuous observations of yields on near-to-maturity TIPS, this
dataset does not include short-term zero-coupon TIPS yields. To approxi-
mate the short-term real interest rate, we use the ex ante short-term real
interest rate implied by our VAR approach described in section II.
Our estimation makes several identifying and simplifying assumptions.
First, we identify σm using the long-run average Sharpe ratio for U.S. equi-
ties, which we set to 0.23 on a quarterly basis (equivalent to 0.46 on an
annual basis). Second, we identify βem as the sample standard deviation of
equity returns in our sample period (0.094 per quarter, or 18.9 percent per
year) divided by σm, for a value of 0.41. Third, we exactly identify xt with
the ex ante short-term real interest rate estimated from the VAR model of
the previous section, which we treat as observed, adjusted by a constant.
That is, we give the Kalman ﬁlter a measurement equation that equates the
VAR-estimated short-term real interest rate to xt with a free constant term
but no measurement error. The inclusion of the constant term is intended to
capture liquidity effects that lower the yields on Treasury bills relative to
the longer-term real yield curve.
Fourth, because the shock εx,t+1 is always premultiplied by vt, we nor-
malize σx to 1. Fifth, we assume that there is perfect correlation between
the shock εx,t+1 and the shock εm,t+1 to the SDF; equivalently, we set σmx
equal to 0.23. This delivers the largest possible time variation in inﬂation-
indexed bond risk premiums and thus maximizes the effect of changing
risk on the TIPS yield curve. Sixth, we treat equation 10 as a measurement
equation with no measurement error, where we replace the covariance on
the left-hand side of the equation with the realized monthly covariance of
returns on 10-year zero-coupon TIPS with returns on stocks. We estimate
the monthly realized covariance using daily observations on stock returns
and on TIPS returns from the Gürkaynak-Sack-Wright dataset. Since βem
and σmx have been already exactly identiﬁed, this is equivalent to identify-
ing the process vt with a scaled version of the covariance of returns on
TIPS and stocks.
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6. The CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) data cover all three major U.S.
stock exchanges. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright estimate zero-coupon TIPS yields by ﬁtting
a ﬂexible functional form, a generalization of Nelson and Siegel (1987) suggested by Svens-
son (1994), to the instantaneous forward rates implied by off-the-run TIPS yields. From ﬁt-
ted forward rates it is straightforward to obtain zero-coupon yields.
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TIPS yield using the model’s solution for this yield and allowing for mea-
surement error. The identifying assumptions we have made imply that we
are exactly identifying xt with the ex ante short-term real interest rate, vt with
the realized covariance of returns on TIPS and stocks, and the log SDF with
stock returns. Thus, our estimation procedure in effect generates hypothet-
ical TIPS yields from these processes and compares them with observed
TIPS yields.
Table 3 reports the parameter estimates from our full model and two
restricted models. The ﬁrst of these two models, reported in the second col-
umn, drops the measurement equation for the realized stock-bond covari-
ance and assumes that the stock-bond covariance is constant, and hence
that TIPS have a constant risk premium, as in the VAR model of section II.
The second restricted model, reported in the last column, generates the
largest possible effects of time-varying risk premiums on TIPS yields by
increasing the persistence of the covariance state variable vt from the freely
estimated value of 0.77, which implies an eight-month half-life for covari-
ance movements, to the largest permissible value of 1.
Figure 9 shows how these three variants of our basic model ﬁt the his-
tory of the 10-year TIPS yield. The yields predicted by the freely estimated
model of changing risk and by the restricted model with a constant bond-
stock covariance are almost on top of one another, diverging only slightly
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates for Alternative Risk Models
Restricted models
Constant-covariance Persistent-risk
Parameter Full model model model
ϕx 0.94 0.93 0.95
µx 0.0028 0.0104 0.0034
ϕv 0.77 NAa Set to 1
µv −2.01 × 10−5 NA 0.0010
σm Set to 0.23 Set to 0.23 Set to 0.23
σx Set to 1 0.0031 Set to 1
σmx 0.23 7.23 × 10−4 0.23
σx′ 0.0048 NA 0.0031
σv 0.0003 NA 0.0004
βem Set to 0.41 NA Set to 0.41
σyield 1.16 × 10−6 1.12 × 10−4 9.14 × 10−6
σcov 4.74 × 10−4 NA 5 × 10−4
Premium 0.0157 0.0016 0.00160
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. NA, not applicable. See the text for descriptions of the models.
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was unusually negative. This indicates that changing TIPS risk is not per-
sistent enough to have a large effect on TIPS yields. Only when we impose
a unit root on the process for the bond-stock covariance do we obtain large
effects of changing risk. This model implies that TIPS yields should have
fallen more dramatically than they did in 2002–03, and again in 2007, when
the covariance of TIPS with stocks turned negative. The persistent-risk
model does capture observed TIPS movements in the first half of 2008,
but it dramatically fails to capture the spike in TIPS yields in the second
half of 2008.
Over all, this exploration of changing risk, as captured by the changing
realized covariance of TIPS returns and aggregate stock returns, suggests
that variations in risk play only a supporting role in the determination of
TIPS yields. The major problem with a risk-based explanation for move-
ments in the inﬂation-indexed yield curve is that the covariance of TIPS
and stocks has moved in a transitory fashion, and thus should not have had
a large effect on TIPS yields unless investors were expecting more persistent
variation and were surprised by an unusual sequence of temporary changes
in risk.
These results contrast with those reported by Campbell, Sunderam,
and Viceira (2009), who ﬁnd that persistent movements in the covariance
between inﬂation and stock returns have had a powerful inﬂuence on the
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data for yields from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2008) and 
for stock returns fom the Center for Research in Security Prices. 















Figure 9. Real Ten-Year Inﬂation-Indexed Bond Yields Implied by Alternative Risk
Models, United States, 1998–2009
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11641-02a_Campbell_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:48 PM  Page 104nominal U.S. Treasury yield curve. They ﬁnd that U.S. inﬂation was nega-
tively correlated with stock returns in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when
the major downside risk for investors was stagﬂation; it has been positively
correlated with stock returns in the 2000s, when investors have been more
concerned about deﬂation.
7 As a result, Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira
argue that the inﬂation risk premium was positive in the 1970s and 1980s
but has been negative in the 2000s, implying even lower expected returns
on nominal Treasury bonds than on TIPS. The movements in inﬂation risk
identiﬁed by Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira are persistent enough to have
important effects on the shape of the nominal U.S. Treasury yield curve,
reducing its slope and concavity relative to what was typical in the 1970s
and 1980s.
IV. The Crisis of 2008 and Institutional Inﬂuences on TIPS Yields
In 2008, as the subprime crisis intensiﬁed, the TIPS yield became highly
volatile and appeared to become suddenly disconnected from the yield on
nominal Treasuries. At the beginning of 2008, the 30-year TIPS yield as
reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis fell to extremely low
levels, as low as 1.66 percent on January 23, 2008. Shorter-maturity TIPS
showed even lower yields, and in the spring and again in the summer of
2008 some of these yields became negative, falling below −0.5 percent,
reminding market participants that zero is not the lower bound for inﬂation-
indexed bond yields. The fall of 2008 then witnessed an unprecedented and
short-lived spike in TIPS yields, peaking at the end of October 2008 when
the 30-year TIPS yield reached 3.44 percent.
These extraordinary short-run movements in TIPS yields are mirrored in
the 10-year TIPS yield shown in ﬁgure 2. The extremely low TIPS yield in
early 2008 was given a convenient explanation by some market observers,
namely, that investors were panicked by the apparently heightened risks in
ﬁnancial markets due to the subprime crisis and sought safety at just about
any price. But if this is the correct explanation, the massive surge in the
TIPS yield later in that year remains a mystery. This leap upward was puz-
zling, since it was not observed in nominal bond yields and so marked a
massive drop in the breakeven inﬂation rate, as seen in ﬁgure 3. The U.K.
market behaved in similar fashion.
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7. The top panel of ﬁgure 6 illustrates the positive correlation of U.S. inﬂation and stock
returns during the 2000s, and the bottom panel shows that this correlation has changed sign
in the United Kingdom since the early 1990s.
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The anomalous sudden jump in inflation-indexed bond yields came
as a total surprise to market participants. Indeed, just as the jump was
occurring in October 2008, some observers were saying that because inﬂa-
tion expectations had become extremely stable, TIPS and nominal Trea-
sury bonds were virtually interchangeable. For example, Marie Brière and
Ombretta Signori concluded, in a paper published in March 2009 (p. 279),
“Although diversiﬁcation was a valuable reason for introducing IL [inﬂa-
tion-linked] bonds in a global portfolio before 2003, this is no longer the
case.” The extent of this surprise suggests that the rise in the TIPS yield,
and its decoupling from nominal Treasury yields, had something to do
with the systemic nature of the crisis that beset U.S. financial institutions
in 2008.
Indeed, the sharp peak in the TIPS yield and the accompanying steep
drop in the breakeven inflation rate occurred shortly after an event that
some observers blame for the anomalous behavior of TIPS yields. This
was the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, announced
on September 15, 2008. The unfolding of the Lehman bankruptcy proceed-
ings also took place over the same interval of time during which the inﬂation-
indexed bond yield made its spectacular leap upward.
Lehman’s bankruptcy was an important event, the first bankruptcy of
a major investment bank since that of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990.
That is not to say that other investment banks did not also get into trouble in
the meantime, especially during the subprime crisis. But the federal govern-
ment had always stepped in to allay fears. Bear Stearns was sold to the com-
mercial bank J.P. Morgan in March 2008 in a deal arranged and ﬁnanced by
the government. Bank of America announced its purchase of Merrill Lynch
on September 14, 2008, again with government ﬁnancial support. Yet the
government decided to let Lehman fail, and investors may have interpreted
this event as indicative of future government policy that might spell major
changes in the economy.
One conceivable interpretation of the events that followed the Lehman
bankruptcy announcement is that the market viewed the bankruptcy as 
a macroeconomic indicator, a sign that the economy would be suddenly
weaker. This could have implied a deterioration in the government’s ﬁscal
position, justifying an increase in expected future real interest rates and
therefore in the long-term real yield on Treasury debt, as well as a decline
in inﬂation expectations, thus explaining the drop in breakeven inﬂation.
However, many observers doubt that the perceived macroeconomic
impact of just this one bankruptcy could bring about such a radical change
in expectations about real interest rates and inﬂation. At one point in 2008
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to Gang Hu and Mihir Worah (2009, p. 1), bond traders at PIMCO, “The
market did not believe that it was possible to realize that kind of real rate or
sustained deﬂation.”
Another interpretation is that there was a shift in the risk premium
for inflation-indexed bonds. In terms of our analysis above, this could
be a change in the covariance of TIPS returns with consumption or wealth.
But such a view sounds even less plausible than the view that the Lehman
effect worked through inﬂation expectations. We have shown that the
observed ﬂuctuations in the covariances of TIPS returns with other vari-
ables are hard to rationalize even after the fact, and so it is hard to see
why the market would have made a major adjustment in this covariance.
Hu and Worah (2009, pp. 1, 3) conclude instead that, “the extremes
in valuation were due to a potent combination of technical factors....
Lehman owned Tips as part of repo trades or posted Tips as counter-
party collateral. Once Lehman declared bankruptcy, both the court and its
counterparty needed to sell these Tips for cash.” The traders at PIMCO
saw then a ﬂood of TIPS on the market, for which there appeared to be few
buyers. Distressed market makers were not willing to risk taking positions
in these TIPS; their distress was marked by a crisis-induced sudden and
catastrophic widening, by October 2008, in TIPS bid-asked spreads. Mak-
ing the situation worse was the fact that some institutional investors in
TIPS had adopted commodity overlay strategies that forced them to sell
TIPS because of the fall at that time in commodity prices. Moreover, insti-
tutional money managers had to confront a sudden loss of client interest in
relative value trades. Such trades, which take advantage of unusual price
differences between securities with related fundamentals, might otherwise
have exploited the abnormally low breakeven inﬂation.
An important clue about the events of fall 2008 is provided by the
diverging behavior of breakeven inﬂation rates in the TIPS cash market and
breakeven inﬂation rates implied by zero-coupon inﬂation swaps during
the months following the Lehman bankruptcy. Zero-coupon inﬂation swaps
are derivatives contracts in which one party pays the other cumulative CPI
(consumer price index) inﬂation over the term of the contract at maturity, in
exchange for a predetermined ﬁxed rate. This rate is known as the “synthetic”
breakeven inﬂation rate, because if inﬂation grew at this ﬁxed rate over the
life of the contract, the net payment on the contract at maturity would be
zero. As with the “cash” breakeven inﬂation rate implied by TIPS and nom-
inal Treasury bonds, this rate reﬂects both expected inﬂation over the rele-
vant period and an inﬂation risk premium.
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(as opposed to newly issued, or on-the-run) TIPS and nominal Treasury
bonds maturing in July 2017, and the synthetic breakeven inﬂation rate
for the 10-year zero-coupon inﬂation swap, from July 2007 through April
2009. The ﬁgure also plots the TIPS asset swap spread, explained below.
The two breakeven rates track each other very closely until mid-September
2008, with the synthetic breakeven inflation rate about 35 to 40 basis
points above the cash breakeven inﬂation rate on average.
This difference in breakeven rates is typical under normal market con-
ditions. According to analysts, it reflects among other things the cost of
manufacturing pure inﬂation protection in the United States. Most market
participants supplying inﬂation protection in the U.S. inﬂation swap market
are leveraged investors such as hedge funds and banks’ proprietary trading
desks. These investors typically hedge their inﬂation swap positions by
simultaneously taking long positions in TIPS and short positions in nominal
Treasuries in the asset swap market. A buying position in an asset swap is
functionally similar to a leveraged position in a bond. In an asset swap, one
party pays the cash ﬂows on a speciﬁc bond and receives in exchange inter-
est at the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) plus a spread known as the
asset swap spread. Typically this spread is negative and larger in absolute
magnitude for nominal Treasuries than for TIPS. Thus, leveraged investors
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Figure 10. Breakeven Inﬂation Rates and Asset Swap Spreads on TIPS, 
July 2007–April 2009
Percent a year Basis points
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Barclays Capital.
a. Synthetic breakeven inflation rate derived from interest rates on zero-coupon inflation swaps.
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cost derived from their long-TIPS, short-nominal Treasuries position.
Figure 10 shows that starting in mid-September 2008, cash breakeven
inﬂation rates fell dramatically while synthetic rates did not fall nearly as
much; at the same time TIPS asset swap spreads increased from their nor-
mal level of about −35 basis points to about +100 basis points. Although not
shown in the ﬁgure, nominal Treasury asset swap spreads remained at their
usual levels. That is, ﬁnancing long positions in TIPS became extremely
expensive relative to historical levels just as their cash price fell abruptly.
There is no reason why declining inﬂation expectations should directly
affect the cost of ﬁnancing long positions in TIPS relative to nominal Trea-
suries. The scenario that these two simultaneous changes suggest instead is
one of intense selling in the cash market and insufﬁcient demand to absorb
those sales—as described by Hu and Worah—and simultaneously another
shortage of capital to ﬁnance leveraged positions in markets other than that
for nominal Treasuries; that is, the bond market events of the fall of 2008
may have been a “liquidity” episode.
Under this interpretation, the synthetic breakeven inﬂation rate was at
the time a better proxy for inﬂation expectations in the marketplace than the
cash breakeven inﬂation rate, despite the fact that in normal times the inﬂa-
tion swap market is considerably less liquid than the cash TIPS market. The
synthetic breakeven inﬂation rate declined from about 3 percent a year to
about 1.5 percent at the trough. This long-run inﬂation expectation is per-
haps more plausible than the 10-year expectation of zero inﬂation reﬂected
in the cash market for off-the-run bonds maturing in 2017.
Interestingly, cash breakeven inflation rates also diverged between
on-the-run and off-the-run TIPS with similar maturities during this period.
The online appendix shows that breakeven rates based on on-the-run TIPS
were lower than those based on off-the-run TIPS. This divergence reﬂected
another feature of TIPS that causes cash breakeven inﬂation rates calculated
from on-the-run TIPS to be poor proxies for inﬂation expectations in the
face of deﬂation risk. Contractually, TIPS holders have the right to redeem
their bonds at maturity for the greater of either par value at issuance or that
value plus accrued inﬂation during the life of the bond. Thus, when there
is a risk of deﬂation after a period of inﬂation, new TIPS issues offer better
deﬂation protection than older ones. Accordingly, on-the-run TIPS should
be more expensive than off-the-run TIPS, and thus their real yields should
be lower. Breakeven inﬂation rates derived from on-the-run TIPS must be
adjusted upward for this deﬂation protection premium to arrive at a measure
of inﬂation expectations.
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as reﬂecting a highly abnormal market situation, where liquidity problems
suddenly created severe ﬁnancial anomalies. This may seem to imply that
one can regard the recent episode as unrepresentative and ignore the obser-
vations from these dates. However, investors in TIPS who would like to
regard them as the safest long-term investment must consider the extra-
ordinary short-term volatility that such events have given their yields.
V. The Uses of Inﬂation-Indexed Bonds
We conclude by drawing out some implications of the recent experience
with inﬂation-indexed bonds for both investors and policymakers.
V.A. Implications for Investors
The basic case for investing in inflation-indexed bonds, stated by
Campbell and Shiller (1997) and further developed by Michael Brennan
and Yihong Xia (2002), Campbell and Viceira (2001, 2002), Campbell,
Yeung Lewis Chan, and Viceira (2003), and Jessica Wachter (2003), is
that these bonds are the safe asset for long-term investors. An inﬂation-
indexed perpetuity delivers a known stream of real spending power to an
inﬁnite-lived investor, and a zero-coupon inﬂation-indexed bond delivers a
known real payment in the distant future to an investor who values wealth
at that single horizon. This argument makes no assumption about the time-
series variation in yields, and so it is not invalidated by the gradual long-
term decline in inﬂation-indexed bond yields since the 1990s, the
mysterious medium-run variations in TIPS yields relative to short-term
real interest rates, the spike in yields in the fall of 2008, or the high daily
volatility of TIPS returns.
There are, however, two circumstances in which other assets can substi-
tute for inﬂation-indexed bonds to provide long-term safe returns. First, if
the breakeven inﬂation rate is constant, as will be the case when the central
bank achieves perfect anti-inﬂationary credibility, then nominal bonds are
perfect substitutes for inﬂation-indexed bonds, and conventional govern-
ment bonds will suit the preferences of conservative long-term investors.
For a time in the mid-2000s, it looked as if this nirvana of central bankers
was imminent, but the events of 2008 dramatically destabilized inﬂation
expectations and reafﬁrmed the distinction between inﬂation-indexed and
nominal bonds.
Second, if the ex ante real interest rate is constant, as Eugene Fama
(1975) famously asserted, then long-term investors can roll over short-term
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Because inﬂation uncertainty is minimal over a month or a quarter, Treasury
bills expose investors to minimal inﬂation risk. In general, they do expose
investors to the risk of persistent variation in the real interest rate, but this
risk is absent if the real interest rate is constant over time.
Investors can tell whether this happy circumstance prevails by forecast-
ing realized real returns on Treasury bills and measuring the movements of
their forecasts, as we did in figure 8, or more simply by measuring the
volatility of inﬂation-indexed bond returns. If inﬂation-indexed bonds have
yields that are almost constant and returns with almost no volatility, then
Treasury bills are likely to be good substitutes.
8Seen from this point of view,
the high daily volatility of inﬂation-indexed bond returns illustrated in ﬁg-
ure 4, far from being a drawback, demonstrates the value of inflation-
indexed bonds for conservative long-term investors.
A simple quantitative measure of the usefulness of inflation-indexed
bonds is the reduction in the long-run standard deviation of a portfolio
that these bonds permit. One can estimate this reduction by calculating the
long-run standard deviation of a portfolio of other assets chosen to mini-
mize long-run risk (what we call the global minimum variance, or GMV,
portfolio). This is the smallest risk that long-run investors can achieve if
inflation-indexed bonds are unavailable. Once inflation-indexed bonds
become available, the minimum long-run risk portfolio consists entirely of
these bonds and has zero long-run risk. Thus, the difference between the
minimized long-run standard deviation of the GMV portfolio and zero
measures the risk reduction that inﬂation-indexed bonds make possible.
9
We constructed a 10-year GMV portfolio consisting of U.S. stocks,
nominal 5-year Treasury bonds, and 3-month Treasury bills. To derive the
composition of this portfolio and its volatility at each horizon, we used the
long-horizon mean-variance approach described in Campbell and Viceira
(2005) and its companion technical guide (Campbell and Viceira 2004). We
estimated a VAR(1) system for the ex post real return on Treasury bills
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8. Strictly speaking, this argument assumes that real yields are described by the expecta-
tions hypothesis of the term structure, so that constant short-term real interest rates imply
constant long-term real yields. Volatile risk or liquidity premiums on inﬂation-indexed
bonds could make their yields volatile even if short-term real interest rates are constant.
However, it is quite unlikely that time variation in risk or liquidity premiums would stabilize
the yields on inﬂation-indexed bonds in an environment of time-varying real interest rates.
9. As an alternative approach, Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) calculate the utility
of an inﬁnite-lived investor who has access to stocks, nominal bonds, and bills, and the util-
ity gain when this investor can also hold an inﬂation-indexed perpetuity. We do not update
this more complex calculation here.
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includes variables known to forecast bond and equity risk premiums: the
log dividend-price ratio, the yield on Treasury bills, and the spread between
that yield and the 5-year Treasury bond yield. From this system we extracted
the conditional variance-covariance of 10-year returns using the formulas
in Campbell and Viceira (2004) and found the portfolio that minimizes this
variance.
Instead of estimating a single VAR system for our entire quarterly sam-
ple, 1953Q1–2008Q4, we estimated two VAR systems, one for 1953Q1–
1972Q4 and another for 1973Q1–2008Q4. We split the sample this way
because we are concerned that the process for inﬂation and the real interest
rate might have changed during the period as a whole. The conditional
long-horizon moments of returns also depend on the quarterly variance-
covariance matrix of innovations, which we estimated using 3-year win-
dows of quarterly data. Within each window and VAR sample period, we
combined the variance-covariance matrix with the full-sample estimate of
the slope coefficients to compute the 10-year GMV portfolio and its
annualized volatility.
Figure 11 compares the estimated standard deviation of the GMV port-
folio with the annualized daily standard deviations of TIPS and inﬂation-
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Figure 11. Volatility of Returns on the Global Minimum Variance Portfolio and on
Inﬂation-Indexed Government Bonds
Standard deviation (percent) Standard deviation (percent)
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg and Center for Research in Security Prices data.
a. Annualized 10-year standard deviation of the 10-year global minimum variance portfolio of U.S. 
stocks, nominal 5-year Treasury bonds, and 3-month Treasury bills, computed from a VAR model as 
described in the text.
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the same GMV standard deviation with the estimated standard deviation
of hypothetical TIPS returns, constructed from the VAR system using the
method of Campbell and Shiller (1997) and section II of this paper, which
assumes the log expectations hypothesis for inﬂation-indexed bonds. The
annualized 10-year standard deviation of the 10-year GMV portfolio is
fairly low in the 1960s, at around 1 percent a year. This is the period that led
Fama (1975) to assert that the ex ante real interest rate is constant over time.
Starting in the 1970s, however, persistent movements in the real interest
rate cause the standard deviation to rise rapidly to about 4 percent a year.
The standard deviation drops back to about 2 percent in the mid-1990s, but
by 2008 it is once again at a historical high of 4 percent. These numbers
imply that inﬂation-indexed bonds substantially reduce risk for long-term
investors.
Both comparisons show that, historically, the minimum long-run risk
that can be achieved using other assets has been high when short-term TIPS
returns have been volatile. In other words, inﬂation-indexed bonds are par-
ticularly good at reducing long-run risk whenever their short-run risk is
high. Such a result may seem paradoxical, but it follows directly from the
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Figure 12. Volatility of Returns on the Global Minimum Variance Portfolio 
and of Hypothetical Quarterly TIPS Returns
Standard deviation (percent)
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bloomberg and Center for Research in Security Prices data. 
a. Annualized standard deviation of quarterly returns.
b. Annualized 10-year standard deviation of the 10-year global minimum variance portfolio of U.S. 
stocks, nominal 5-year Treasury bonds, and 3-month Treasury bills, computed from a VAR model as 
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10. This point is related to the asset pricing result discussed in section III.A, namely,
that when one controls for the stock market covariance of inﬂation-indexed bonds, the equi-
librium risk premium on these bonds for a conservative, inﬁnite-lived, representative
investor is declining in their variance.
11. David Turner, “College to Invest 15m Loan in Shares,” Financial Times, October
27, 2008.
fact that the need for inﬂation-indexed bonds for long-term safety is greater
when real interest rates vary persistently over time.
10
Inflation-indexed bonds also play an important role for institutional
investors who need to hedge long-term real liabilities. Pension funds and
insurance companies with multiyear commitments should use inflation-
indexed bonds to neutralize the swings in the present value of their long-
dated liabilities due to changes in long-term real interest rates. Of course,
these swings become apparent to institutional investors only when they dis-
count real liabilities using market real interest rates, as the United Kingdom
has required in recent years. The resulting institutional demand for inﬂation-
indexed gilts seems to have been an important factor driving down their
yields (Viceira and Mitsui 2003; Vayanos and Vila 2007).
The total demand of long-term investors for inflation-indexed bonds
will depend not only on their risk properties, but also on their expected
returns relative to other available investments and on the risk tolerance
of the investors. An aggressive long-term investor might wish to short
inflation-indexed bonds and invest the proceeds in equities, since stocks
have only very rarely underperformed bonds over three or more decades
in U.S. and U.K. data. In 2008 it was reported that Clare College, Univer-
sity of Cambridge, was planning to undertake such a strategy.
11 However,
Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) estimated positive long-term demand
for inﬂation-indexed bonds by long-term investors who also have the ability
to borrow short term or to issue long-term nominal bonds.
Long-term inflation-indexed bonds may be of interest to some short-
term investors. Given their high short-run volatility, however, short-term
investors will wish to hold these bonds only if they expect to receive high
excess returns over Treasury bills (as might reasonably have been the case
in 1999–2000 or during the yield spike of the fall of 2008), or if they hold
other assets, such as stocks, whose returns can be hedged by an inﬂation-
indexed bond position. We have shown evidence that TIPS and inﬂation-
indexed gilts did hedge stock returns during the downturns of the early
2000s and the late 2000s, and this should make them attractive to short-term
equity investors.
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advantage. But in developed countries these bonds are illiquid only rel-
ative to the same countries’ nominal government bonds, which, along with
foreign exchange, are the most liquid ﬁnancial assets. Compared with almost
any other long-term investment vehicle, inﬂation-indexed government bonds
are extremely cheap to trade. In addition, long-term buy-and-hold investors
should care very little about transactions costs since they will rarely need
to turn over their bond positions.
V.B. Implications for Policymakers
In managing the public debt, the Treasury seeks to minimize the
average cost of debt issuance while paying due regard to risk, including
refinancing risk. It is commonly thought that short-term Treasury bills
are less expensive than long-term debt but that exclusive reliance on
bills would impose an unacceptable refinancing risk, as bills must fre-
quently be rolled over.
In the period since TIPS were introduced in 1997, they have proved to
be an expensive form of debt ex post, because of the unexpected decline
in real interest rates from the 1990s through early 2008. However, our
analysis implies that the cost of TIPS should be lower than that of Trea-
sury bills ex ante, because TIPS offer investors desirable insurance
against future variation in real interest rates. This is the relevant consid-
eration going forward, as Jennifer Roush, William Dudley, and Michelle
Steinberg Ezer (2008) emphasize, and therefore governments should not
be deterred from issuing inflation-indexed bonds by the high realized
returns on their past issues.
In the current environment, with inﬂation positively correlated with stock
prices, the inﬂation risk premium in nominal Treasury bonds is likely nega-
tive. This implies that long-term nominal debt should be even cheaper for the
Treasury than TIPS. However, the correlation between inﬂation and stock
prices has changed sign in the past (Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira 2009),
and it may easily do so again in the future.
Several other considerations also suggest that inﬂation-indexed bonds
are a valuable form of public debt. First, to the extent that particular forms
of debt have different investment clienteles, all with downward-sloping
demand curves for bonds, it is desirable to diversify across different forms
so as to tap the largest possible market for government debt (Greenwood
and Vayanos 2008; Vayanos and Vila 2007).
Second, inﬂation-indexed bonds can be used to draw inferences about
bond investors’ inﬂation expectations, and such information is extremely
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such as those that occurred in the fall of 2008, complicate the measurement
of inﬂation expectations, but our analysis shows that it is possible to derive
meaningful information even in these extreme conditions.
Finally, inﬂation-indexed bonds provide a safe real asset for long-term
investors and promote public understanding of inﬂation. Fiscal authorities
should take these public beneﬁts into account as part of their broader mis-
sion to improve the functioning of their economies.
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12. Recent papers extracting information from the inﬂation-indexed yield curve include
Beechey and Wright (2008), Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2009), D’Amico, Kim, and
Wei (2008), Grishchenko and Huang (2008), and Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken (2008).
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
FREDERIC S. MISHKIN This paper by John Campbell, Robert Shiller,
and Luis Viceira is excellent. Indeed, I would have titled it, “Everything
You Always Wanted to Know about Inﬂation-Indexed Bond Markets, But
Were Afraid to Ask.”
1 The paper documents many key facts and puzzles
about this market, including the following:
—the decline in long-term real yields on inﬂation-indexed bonds from
the 1990s;
—the instability of real yields and returns on these bonds during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis;
—the negative correlation of returns on these bonds with those on stock
prices, indicating that these bonds can be used to hedge equity risk;
—the fact that real yields on these bonds differ in different countries;
—the fact that the expectations hypothesis view that long-term real
yields are driven by expectations of short-term real interest rates is sup-
ported by the data;
—but also the fact that risk and liquidity premiums on these bonds are
very important and are volatile, suggesting that institutional factors matter
a lot to their yields;
—the fact that long-term inﬂation-indexed bonds have high short-term
risk;
—but also the fact that this is fully consistent with their being good
long-term risk reducers.
1. For readers too young to remember, this is a takeoff on the title of a popular book and
a Woody Allen movie from the 1970s.
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the investor. Given my comparative advantage as a former governor of the
Federal Reserve, I will instead provide a different perspective by discussing
why their analysis is so important for policymakers.
One of the most important issues for monetary policymakers is whether
they can keep long-run inflation expectations anchored. Such anchoring
is key to successful monetary policy for several reasons, and this is one of
the reasons that I and many other monetary economists have argued strongly
for some form of inﬂation targeting. First, anchoring long-run inﬂation expec-
tations leads to more stable inflation outcomes. As I discussed in Mishkin
(2007), long-run expectations of inﬂation on the part of households and
ﬁrms are a key factor in determining the actual behavior of inﬂation. If these
expectations are unstable, so, too, will be inﬂation. Moreover, the commit-
ment that inflation targeting provides can play an important role in min-
imizing the risk of what Marvin Goodfriend (1993) has called “inflation
scares,” that is, episodes in which longer-term inﬂation expectations jump
sharply in response to speciﬁc macroeconomic developments or monetary
policy actions.
Second, anchoring long-run inﬂation expectations can help stabilize out-
put and employment. Speciﬁcally, to counter a contractionary demand shock,
the monetary authorities need to reduce the short-run nominal interest
rate; however, the effectiveness of such a policy action may be hindered
if long-run inflation expectations are not firmly anchored. For example,
if the private sector becomes less certain about the longer-run inflation
outlook, the resulting increase in the inflation risk premium could boost
longer-term interest rates by more than the increase in expected infla-
tion. The higher premium would in turn place upward pressure on the
real cost of long-term financing for households and businesses (whose
debt contracts are almost always expressed in nominal terms) and hence
might partly offset any direct monetary stimulus. Thus, firmly anchoring
inﬂation expectations can make an important contribution to the effective-
ness of the central bank’s actions aimed at stabilizing economic activity in
the face of adverse demand shocks.
Third, anchoring long-run inﬂation expectations provides the central bank
with greater flexibility to respond decisively to adverse demand shocks.
Well-anchored expectations help ensure that an aggressive policy easing is
not misinterpreted as signaling a shift in the central bank’s inﬂation objec-
tive; they thereby minimize the possibility that long-run inﬂation expecta-
tions could move upward in response to the easing and lead to a rise in actual
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009
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financial market stress; at such times, prompt and decisive policy action
may be required to prevent a severe contraction in economic activity that
could further exacerbate the uncertainty and the stress, leading to a further
deterioration in macroeconomic activity, and so on. Thus, by providing the
central bank with greater ﬂexibility in mitigating the risk of such an adverse
feedback loop, well-anchored long-run inﬂation expectations play an impor-
tant role in promoting ﬁnancial stability as well as the stability of economic
activity and inﬂation.
Fourth, well-anchored long-run inﬂation expectations can help prevent
deﬂation from setting in—a particularly relevant consideration today. Deﬂa-
tion can severely weaken economic activity by triggering debt-deflation
of the type described by Irving Fisher (1933), in which the falling price
level increases the real indebtedness of firms, undermining their balance
sheets.
Fifth, well-anchored long-run inﬂation expectations can help minimize
the effects of an adverse cost shock such as a persistent rise in the price of
energy. Generally speaking, such shocks tend to result in weaker eco-
nomic activity as well as higher inﬂation. However, when long-run inﬂa-
tion expectations are ﬁrmly anchored, these shocks are likely to have only
transitory effects on actual inﬂation, thus obviating the need to raise inter-
est rates aggressively to keep inflation from rising. Thus, well-anchored
long-run inflation expectations can help reduce output and employment
ﬂuctuations that impose unnecessary hardship on workers and on the econ-
omy more broadly.
The bottom line is that anchoring long-run inflation expectations is so
important to successful monetary policy that the monetary authorities need
to know what is happening to these expectations at all times. Indeed, when
I was on the Federal Reserve Board, we spent a lot of time and effort try-
ing to assess where long-run inflation expectations were heading, and we
looked at several measures of these expectations. Surveys of households,
such as the University of Michigan Inflation Expectation Survey, are one
important source of information, but they have an important drawback.
Research in the field of behavioral economics suggests that biases due to
framing are likely to make survey measures of long-run inflation expec-
tations unreliable. The problem is that when survey measures of short-
run inflation expectations change, survey measures of long-run inflation
expectations are likely to move with them, even if long-run expectations
have not changed. This might happen because questions about both are
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(“frames”) the response to the second, resulting in a spurious co-movement
between the two. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened recently. When
oil prices rose, driving up inﬂation in terms of the consumer price index
(CPI), not only did one-year inﬂation expectations move up in the Michigan
survey, which makes sense, but so did measures of 5-to-10-year inﬂation
expectations. Then, when CPI inflation and one-year survey expectations
came back down, so, too, did the 5-to-10-year survey expectations. These
temporary fluctuations in the 5-to-10-year survey measure were almost
surely illusory.
A second measure of long-run inﬂation expectations comes from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). In recent years this measure has
been rock steady. Of course, this may indicate that inﬂation expectations
are ﬁrmly anchored, but it may instead be that the measure is failing to cap-
ture long-run inﬂation expectations that are in fact moving around.
Skepticism about survey measures is one reason why many economists,
including myself, are more willing to trust expectations measures that are
derived from financial markets data. After all, people buying or selling
securities are putting their money where their mouth is—they thus have
a strong incentive to base their decisions on their true forecasts. Here the
inflation-indexed bond market provides exactly the information desired.
The difference between interest rates on nominal government bonds and
those on inﬂation-indexed bonds, or what the paper calls “breakeven inﬂa-
tion” and the Federal Reserve Board calls “inﬂation compensation,” serves
as a measure of inﬂation expectations. Such measures can be used as the
canary in the coal mine to let monetary policymakers know if inﬂation
expectations are becoming unanchored. Indeed, when I was at Board meet-
ings, I would always ask Jonathan Wright, the other discussant of this paper,
what he thought long-run breakeven measures of inﬂation were telling us
about long-run inﬂation expectations.
As the paper points out, however, there is one big problem with using
breakeven inﬂation measures from inﬂation-indexed bonds to assess whether
long-run inﬂation expectations are becoming unanchored, namely, the pres-
ence of risk and liquidity premiums. The paper demonstrates that these
premiums are substantial and seem to vary a lot. Sorting out what drives
these premiums is thus key to helping policymakers evaluate what is hap-
pening to inﬂation expectations, and the paper attempts to do that.
The results in the paper raise three issues, however. First, the standard
risk premium theories do not seem to explain much of the actual move-
ments in inﬂation-indexed bond yields. Second, these theories suggest that
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risk and equity risk, in which case inﬂation-indexed bonds should have a
negative risk premium. Yet, to the contrary, they seem to have a positive
risk premium. Both of these ﬁndings suggest that the existing theories do
not tell us much about why liquidity and risk premiums vary. Third, it
appears that a lot of the ﬂuctuation in real yields on inﬂation-indexed
bonds is due to institutional factors. This became very apparent during the
recent period of ﬁnancial market stress, when there were huge swings in
these yields. However, as the paper points out, how these institutional fac-
tors affect real yields on these bonds is not well understood.
The paper’s bottom line is that ﬁnancial economists do not yet under-
stand what causes the risk and liquidity premiums on inﬂation-indexed
bonds to move around. This means that extracting information from these
bonds about expected inﬂation is not easy.
A striking example of this problem was occurring at the time of this
conference. As the paper shows, long-run breakeven inﬂation as measured
by the difference in bond yields declined precipitously as the economy
went into a tailspin. Does this mean that long-run inflation expectations
became unanchored in the downward direction? If so, the situation was
dangerous indeed, because it meant that deﬂation was more likely to set in,
and aggressive monetary policy to prevent this unanchoring of inflation
expectations was called for. Yet because one could not be sure what was
happening to the risk and liquidity premiums on inflation-indexed bonds,
neither could one be sure that this decline in breakeven inflation really
meant that long-run inflation expectations had fallen.
Even though there was still some uncertainty about what inflation-
indexed bonds were saying about long-run inflation expectations, I do
think the sharp fall in breakeven inflation was cause for worry—that the
dangers of deflation were real. To me this suggests that it is even more
imperative that the Federal Reserve take steps to anchor inflation expec-
tations better. This is why I have argued, both when I was a governor of
the Federal Reserve and afterward,
2 that if ever there was a time for the
Federal Reserve to announce an explicit, numerical inflation objective,
that time is now.
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2. Mishkin (2008); Frederic S. Mishkin, “In Praise of an Explicit Number for Inﬂation,”
Financial Times, January 12, 2009, p. 7.
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COMMENT BY
JONATHAN H. WRIGHT It is now just over a decade since the United
States began issuing inﬂation-linked Treasury bonds. This paper by John
Campbell, Robert Shiller, and Luis Viceira is a timely and excellent analy-
sis of what has been learned from the pricing of these new securities 
and their counterparts in other countries. TIPS yields have been more
volatile than might have been anticipated. Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira
discuss the reasons why this is so before turning to the most topical issue,
namely, explaining the behavior of TIPS in the recent ﬁnancial crisis.
ARE RISK PREMIUMS ON INFLATION-INDEXED BONDS POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE?
Abstracting for the moment from issues of liquidity, the yield on an 
inﬂation-linked bond is the sum of the average expected real short-term
interest rate over the life of the bond and a risk premium. Campbell, Shiller,
and Viceira use both a consumption-based model of asset pricing and a
capital asset pricing model to argue that the risk premium on TIPS ought to
be low or even negative. That would make them an ideal instrument for a
Treasury seeking to minimize expected debt-servicing costs.
Some simple pieces of empirical evidence can be brought to bear on the
question of the typical sign of the risk premium on such bonds. The average
5-to-10-year-forward TIPS yield from January 2003 to August 2008 was
2
1⁄2 percent. If the risk premium on TIPS is zero or negative, this means that
the expectation of r*, the equilibrium real short-term interest rate, must be
at least 2
1⁄2 percent (abstracting from any liquidity premium, but this was a
time when TIPS liquidity was generally good). This seems a rather high
number. Expectations of real short-term interest rates 5 to 10 years hence,
computed from the twice-yearly Blue Chip survey of economic forecasters,
are volatile but were around 2 percent over this period. This reasoning sug-
gests that risk premiums on TIPS are positive.
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linked bonds. In normal circumstances one might suppose that expecta-
tions of real short-term interest rates 5 to 10 years hence are fairly flat.
If the forward TIPS yield curve at those horizons slopes up, that would
suggest that term premiums are positive, and if the curve slopes down, 
it would suggest that they are negative. Table 1 shows the average slopes
of the forward (ﬁve to six years out) yield curves on nominal and inﬂation-
linked bonds in the United States and in the United Kingdom over the period
from January 2003 to August 2008.
1 In the United Kingdom the yield curve
for nominal bonds slopes up whereas the yield curve for inflation-linked
gilts slopes down—evidence for the view expressed in the paper. In the
United States the evidence is not so clear: the inflation-linked curve is
flatter than the nominal one, but both slope up.
Taken together, this simple evidence does not seem to me to support the
view that risk premiums on TIPS have typically been negative, although I
agree that they are much lower than their nominal counterparts.
THE TIPS MARKET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS. Since the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, yields on inﬂation-linked and nominal bonds
have decoupled and have been exceptionally volatile. The yields on some
inﬂation-linked bonds rose above their nominal counterparts, making the
breakeven inﬂation rate negative. This could represent either a fear of deﬂa-
tion or special demand for the comparative liquidity of nominal securities.
Knowing which it is matters a lot. Indeed, it is surely the most important
thing to understand from the TIPS market right now. It is a hard question to
answer, but there are some clues.
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Table 1. Average Slopes of Forward Yield Curves on Nominal and Inﬂation-Linked
Government Bondsa
Basis points
Bond United Kingdom United States
Nominal 0.5 28.2
Inﬂation-linked −6.5 13.7
Sources: Bank of England data; Federal Reserve research data (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2007,
forthcoming).
a. Spread of six-year-ahead over ﬁve-year-ahead continuously compounded instantaneous forward
rates for U.K. and U.S. yield curves; the spread is averaged over all days from the start of January 2003
to the end of August 2008.
1. Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) did a similar comparison for an earlier sample period.
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less than the face value of the bond, even if the price level falls over 
the life of the bond. This gives TIPS an option-like feature in which the
“strike price” is the reference CPI (that is, the price level at the time that
the bond is issued). For a newly issued bond, any deflation will result 
in this option being in the money. For a bond issued, say, five years ago,
however, deﬂation has to be very severe—enough to unwind all the cumu-
lative inflation over the past five years—before this deflation option has
any value.
This means that one can obtain information on the perceived probability
of deflation by comparing the real yields on pairs of TIPS with compa-
rable maturity dates but different reference CPIs. Figure 1 plots the real
yields on the April 2013 and July 2013 TIPS. These were issued in 2008
and 2003, and the reference CPIs are 211.37 and 183.66, respectively.
Before September 2008, the real yields on these two bonds were compara-
ble, as the deﬂation option was perceived to be too far out of the money to
matter. But subsequently the spread soared to 2 percentage points. The nat-
ural interpretation is that investors started to put substantial odds on deﬂa-
tion taking hold, increasing the relative attractiveness of the more recently
issued TIPS.
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Figure 1. Yields on Two TIPS of Comparable Maturity but Differing Issue Dates, 2008–09
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lower bound on the implied probability of deflation over the period until
2013. This requires a number of strong assumptions, including risk neu-
trality.
2 But the calculation is based on comparing two TIPS yields, not
a TIPS yield with a nominal yield, and so the technical factors that
Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira cite as pushing down TIPS prices in the
fall of 2008 should not distort this calculation, unless they affected one
TIPS issue more than the other. Figure 2 shows how this implied prob-
ability of deflation evolved over time. From around zero before Sep-
tember 2008, it soared to over 60 percent before falling back to about 
10 percent early in 2009. Again, the calculation embeds many strong
assumptions, but it is only a lower bound, and so it seems reasonable to
think that fear of deﬂation explains a signiﬁcant part of the unusual behav-
ior of TIPS last fall. That fear is now much reduced but has not entirely
gone away.
Fear of deﬂation was surely not the only inﬂuence on inﬂation-linked
bonds over this period; issues that come under the broad heading of liquid-
ity were important, too. Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira make a compelling
case that TIPS prices were depressed last fall as leveraged investors were
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2. Here are the mechanics of the calculation. Pretend that the April 2013 and July 2013
TIPS are both zero-coupon bonds maturing June 1, 2013, and are identical apart from their
reference CPIs. Let m denote the remaining time to maturity in years. Let x denote the
CPI at the maturity date, and f(x) and F(x) the probability density and cumulative distribu-
tion functions of x, respectively. Assume that agents are risk-neutral. The reference CPIs
are xu = 211.37 and xl = 183.66 for the April 2013 and the July 2013 bond, respectively,
so that their principal repayments per dollar of face value are max(1, x/xu) and max
(1, x/xl), respectively. Under these assumptions, the difference between the July 2013 and the
April2013 continuously compounded TIPS yields is
which means that So the
risk-neutral probability of deﬂation (that is, of the price index in 2013 being below xu = 211.37,  
which is also approximately its current level) is bounded below as
This is the probability shown in ﬁgure 2. The assumptions made are strong, and it is possible
that part of the spread between the two TIPS represents instead a premium for the greater
liquidity of the on-the-run issue, the April 2013 TIPS. However, there has never been much
evidence of an on-the-run premium in the TIPS market, and qualitatively similar spreads
between other pairs of TIPS issues with close maturity dates but different reference CPIs can
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3 Refet Gürkaynak, Brian
Sack, and I (forthcoming) estimate that worsening liquidity pushed up
ﬁve-year TIPS yields by more than a percentage point in the fall of 2008.
The issue of liquidity can be seen starkly by comparing the yield on the
April 2013 TIPS with the yield curve on nominal Treasury bonds. Because
this TIPS was issued in 2008 (when the CPI was around its current level),
and because the inﬂation adjustment to the TIPS principal cannot be neg-
ative, this particular TIPS effectively becomes a nominal security in the
event of deﬂation,
4 while of course it pays off more than a nominal secu-
rity in the event of inﬂation. Thus, the payoff on this security stochasti-
cally dominates the payoff on a nominal Treasury bond of corresponding
130 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009
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Source: Authorís calc ulations.










Figure 2. Probability of Deﬂation as Calculated from TIPS of Differing 
Issue Dates, 2008–09
3. As Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira point out, the divergence between TIPS breakeven
rates and rates quoted on inﬂation swaps is strongly suggestive of distressed TIPS sales.
However, the inﬂation swaps market in the United States is tiny, with a trading volume
roughly 1 percent of that in TIPS. One might be hesitant to read too much into prices from
such a small and illiquid market.
4. This neglects the inﬂation adjustment to the coupon, which can be negative. The coupon
rate on the April 2013 TIPS is tiny (five-eighths of a percentage point), and so even a siz-
able deﬂation should have only a small effect on the pricing of the security through coupon
indexation.
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and comparable-maturity nominal Treasury bonds went negative for an
extended period in late 2008 and early 2009, and it was large and negative
at times. This makes no sense from a standard asset pricing perspective, as
it means that investors were leaving an arbitrage opportunity on the table.
And even though the spread is now positive once again, it remains remark-
ably low given that there are surely sizable odds in favor of a pickup in inﬂa-
tion between now and 2013.
Lawrence Summers (1985) once quipped that financial economics
entailed simply checking that two-quart bottles of ketchup sold for twice as
much as one-quart bottles. Alas, it is not so any more—there have recently
been many examples of investors seemingly leaving arbitrage opportuni-
ties unexploited. The comparison between the April 2013 TIPS yield and
the nominal yield curve is one example. A second is the fact that the yield
on old 30-year Treasury bonds is systematically higher than the yield on
off-the-run 10-year notes of the same maturity. Another is that the yields on
Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp) bonds, which are guaranteed by
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Percentage points
Source: Bloomberg data and author’s calculations using the Federal Reserve Board’s smoothed yield 
curve.
a. Yield on nominal Treasury securities minus the yield on April 2013 TIPS (both securities of 
comparable maturity).










Figure 3. Yield Spread between Nominal Treasury Bonds and the Most Recently Issued
Five-Year TIPS
a
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5. This is not just the implicit guarantee that could be thought to apply to agency securi-
ties in general. Rather, Refcorp bonds have principal payments that are fully collateralized
by nonmarketable Treasury securities and coupon payments that are guaranteed by the Trea-
sury under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act.
6. One way to improve TIPS market functioning might be to encourage the formation
of a TIPS futures market. Such a market would make hedging cheaper and easier while
improving liquidity in the cash market as well.
the Treasury,5 are nonetheless substantially higher than yields on ordinary
Treasury securities of comparable maturity.
All these Treasury market anomalies are conventionally treated as the
effects of a “liquidity premium.” For example, the cheapness of TIPS could
be thought of as the compensation that investors demand for the poor liq-
uidity of these instruments relative to nominal bonds. But TIPS are mainly
bought by buy-and-hold investors, and bid-ask spreads on these securities
are tiny. The cheapness of TIPS thus cannot really be rationalized as sim-
ply amortizing the transactions costs of a long-term investor. Moreover,
as ﬁgure 4 shows, trading volume in TIPS (from the New York Federal
Reserve Bank’s survey of primary dealers) has declined but is still around
its level in 2003. All this indicates to me that the TIPS liquidity premium
has to have some explanation beyond just transactions costs. As Campbell,
Shiller, and Viceira indicate, this explanation might be along the lines of
a segmented market with arbitrageurs who rationally pass up hold-to-
maturity arbitrage opportunities at times of market stress (Greenwood and
Vayanos 2008; Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
6
CENTRAL BANK PURCHASES OF TIPS. In standard equilibrium asset pricing
models, a decision by the Federal Reserve to purchase bonds should do
nothing to their price, unless expectations of future short-term interest
rates are thereby affected (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003). Sufﬁciently
large purchases would result in a corner solution in which the Federal
Reserve owned all of the particular security being purchased, but the price
would still be unaffected. However, if markets are segmented and highly
illiquid, this story may break down.
The reaction to the announcement following the March 2009 Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting is a telling “event study” of the
effects of central bank purchases. On that occasion the FOMC surprised
market participants by announcing that the Federal Reserve would buy
$300 billion in Treasury securities. The yield curves for both nominal and
inflation-linked securities right before and after this announcement are
shown in figure 5. Both moved down sharply, but the TIPS yield curve
moved even more, especially at shorter maturities. The magnitude of this
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learned from the announcement about the expected path of future short-
term interest rates. Other announcements of this sort by the Federal Reserve
and by foreign central banks have had comparable effects. This indicates
that central banks can indeed drive down longer-term interest rates by
direct purchases of securities, at least at times of market stress. Of course,
aggregate demand is more sensitive to the long-term interest rates paid
by households and businesses than to Treasury yields. But lower Treasury
rates could nonetheless spill over into private sector borrowing costs.
More important, if changing asset supply affects prices in the Treasury
market, then the same should be true in the markets for corporate bonds
and mortgage-backed securities, meaning that the Federal Reserve could
improve financial conditions by buying assets in these markets, too.
CONCLUSIONS. TIPS contain valuable information for economists and
policymakers. In normal times they can be used to infer expectations of
inﬂation and real short-term interest rates. They still can, but in the ﬁnancial
crisis that began last year, the most important information these securities
provide is of how dysfunctional asset markets were and, to a large extent,
still are. I emphasize two conclusions. First, in a ﬁnancial crisis, markets are
segmented and illiquid, and changes in effective asset supply brought about
by Federal Reserve purchases can and evidently do have large effects on
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York FR 2004 survey.
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Figure 4. Trading Volume in TIPS, 2002–09a
11641-02b_Campbell-comments_rev.qxd  8/14/09  12:49 PM  Page 133prices. Second, policymakers and the press are often obsessed with ﬁnding
the “market price” of extraordinarily opaque securities. TIPS are extremely
simple securities. If, for whatever reason, the market cannot price TIPS
coherently, then any faith in the ability of the market to come up with the
textbook valuation of esoteric ﬁnancial instruments seems quite misplaced.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Matthew Shapiro agreed that market seg-
mentation likely accounted for the spike in the TIPS yield in November.
He suggested that hedge funds and other institutions were desperate for
liquidity at that time. TIPS were among the few assets that were holding
their value reasonably well, and so they were among the assets that got
dumped on the market, thus revealing substantial segmentation between the
market for indexed and that for nonindexed Treasury securities. Shapiro
also suggested that with the breakdown of the barrier between fiscal and
monetary policy observed in the response to the financial crisis, TIPS
were an increasingly important tool for jointly disciplining fiscal and
monetary policy. He speculated, however, that in the event of a hyper-
inflation, Congress might impose a windfall profits tax on the inflation
indexation component of TIPS returns.
Ricardo Reis noticed that both expected inflation and the differential
between TIPS and nominal bond yields had remained stable until around
2006, when the relationship started to break down. He compared this to
the movement in oil prices shown in James Hamilton’s paper in this vol-
ume. Oil prices went up and then came down by a lot, which, Reis felt,
could have changed perceptions of what was happening to oil prices even
at a 10-year horizon. He proposed that expectations of movements in the
price of oil might account for part of the risk and liquidity premiums
observed in TIPS prices, given that the Federal Reserve targets core inﬂa-
tion, which excludes oil, whereas TIPS are indexed to overall inflation.
Reis also suggested that much of CPI inflation is actually relative price
inﬂation, which would impact TIPS’ hedging potential. His own research
with Mark Watson found that 75 percent of annual variation, and 85 per-
cent of quarterly variation, in the CPI is due to relative price changes. The
results diminish over longer time horizons but are still in the range of 5 to
40 percent at a 10-year horizon. He suggested that relative price changes
may also capture changes in the relative productivity of different sectors,
providing a possible hedging opportunity in expected inﬂation based on
relative productivity changes between sectors.
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the central bank can manipulate nominal things but cannot manipulate real
things, including real interest rates, and especially long-term real rates. He
interpreted the evidence in the paper as showing that this theory is not just
slightly wrong but very wrong. The paper’s findings, in his view, are rel-
evant to formulas such as the Taylor rule, where the real interest rate is
usually assumed to be constant at 2 percent and it is the other factors that
change. As a long-time advocate of inflation-linked bonds, Blinder had
been excited when Campbell and Shiller’s 1996 paper put an actual number
on the likely interest rate savings to the Treasury. That paper, he recalled,
said that TIPS should be cheaper for the Treasury because they were less
risky to bondholders and would therefore pay a lower rate of return. In real-
ity, they have not paid a lower rate, which, Blinder reasoned, was due to
their lesser liquidity compared with nominal bonds. He wondered whether
the main message of the paper was that economists have been focusing too
much on risk and not enough on liquidity.
James Hamilton asked whether TIPS served equally well as nominal
Treasuries as collateral for credit default swaps. John Campbell answered
that he did not believe so but was unsure whether the difference was large
and how much of the yield spread it would explain. He noted that there are
other costs to using TIPS, such as larger “haircuts,” which make their use
as collateral less standard.
Benjamin Friedman expressed surprise that both the paper and the dis-
cussion thus far had proceeded entirely on a pre-tax basis. He suggested
that differential taxation might impact TIPS’ hedging properties, especially
now that tax rates for individuals are lower on qualiﬁed dividends.
Michael Woodford commented on whether recent TIPS behavior indi-
cated market segmentation. He felt this to be the most obvious explanation,
but he disagreed with Jonathan Wright’s hypothesis that market segmenta-
tion implies that Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury securities should be
an effective way of stimulating aggregate demand. He instead proposed that
as a result of market segmentation, a policy designed to lower TIPS yields
(or other long-term Treasury yields) may change only the relationship of
those yields to other real interest rates; the desired effect of such a policy,
that of affecting the terms on which others can borrow, need not occur.
Justin Wolfers included himself among those economists who have
always been hopeful that prices contain a lot of embedded information.
Looking at the prices reported in the paper, however, he was glad that he
was not a macroﬁnance economist looking for structural interpretations of
price movements, because the conclusion he felt drawn to was that market
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the authors try to provide some guidance on determining under what cir-
cumstances TIPS prices will be uninformative.
Steven Davis was struck by the evidence for a market segmentation inter-
pretation of TIPS behavior and said he would have liked to see a more
thorough explanation of the extent, nature, and importance of that segmen-
tation. He suggested that the authors conduct additional exercises that
would help pinpoint where the segmentation occurs: is it between TIPS
and nominal Treasuries, across different vintages and payoff horizons of
TIPS themselves, or in markets that are thinly traded versus those that are
not? Understanding this would be useful, he believed, in determining when
drawing inferences from these securities about expectations and inﬂation
might be more problematic. He also wanted to know whether the observed
asset pricing anomalies occurred only in a very thinly traded, less important
part of the market or were endemic to the system as a whole.
David Romer thought that segmentation was perhaps too easy an expla-
nation and proposed instead that certain features of the market may dis-
suade people from arbitraging TIPS. It would be worth asking professional
investors why TIPS do not provide a riskless opportunity or whether some
sort of agency problem inhibits their purchase.
Gregory Mankiw addressed Alan Blinder’s comment that a major argu-
ment for the creation of TIPS had been their lower cost of ﬁnancing for the
Treasury. He wondered whether that argument had been the primary one,
and, if it had and now turned out to be wrong, whether Blinder felt that TIPS
had been a mistake and should be phased out. Blinder responded that it
had been the primary argument and that TIPS were a mistake from that
perspective, but that TIPS should not therefore disappear, because they
still provide a low-risk investment vehicle for investors, albeit at a cost
to taxpayers.
Jonathan Wright addressed the question of whether purchases of large
quantities of Treasuries would affect corporate borrowing and mortgage
interest rates. The Federal Reserve’s announcement of Treasury purchases
had had some impact on these rates, but it was small. He suggested that the
apparent market segmentation meant that the Federal Reserve could lower
the interest rates paid by households and businesses more substantially, but
only by buying assets that are riskier than Treasury securities, including
securities with ratings below triple-A.
Janice Eberly remarked, in response to David Romer’s comment, that a
great deal of research is being conducted on markets for bonds similar to
Treasuries that are trading at much higher premiums. For example, student
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basis points higher than Treasuries with the same maturity. The research
she described is attempting to determine whether certain features of TIPS,
like the deﬂation option, explain some of the difference, or whether charac-
teristics of the other securities explain it, or whether market segmentation
is the explanation.
Luigi Zingales further addressed David Romer’s question by sharing
answers given by a University of Chicago faculty member turned bond
trader. The trader’s explanation relied primarily on liquidity. After the
Lehman Brothers collapse, the lenders who had to repossess the securities
offered as collateral by Lehman discovered that they had to suffer losses
when they liquidated a large amount of these relatively illiquid bonds. The
differentiation in corporate bonds issued by the same entity makes the mar-
ket for these securities segmented and thus less liquid. When many lenders
dumped bonds on the market at the same time, they could not get full price
because there were too few buyers. Without collateralized lending, it was
more difﬁcult to exploit arbitrage opportunities. As a result, many arbi-
trage opportunities became available. When many violations of arbitrage
are occurring at the same time, Zingales thought it likely that traders with
limited resources would focus on the low-hanging fruit, acting on the easi-
est and most proﬁtable opportunities while ignoring others.
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